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OPINION
T
he term “safety net” usually has a positive connotation,
conjuring images of a caring society that looks after its
most unfortunate members. The safety net that protects
individuals against financial misfortunes can come from many
sources: personal savings, family assistance, or community-based
charities. Some of this protection also comes from the government,
in the form of such programs as unemployment insurance, food
stamps, Social Security, and Medicaid. Taken together, it is common
to refer to such government programs as the “social safety net.”
There is a second set of government policies that come
under the safety net label. These are government programs
that guarantee the debts of private borrowers. Federal
Deposit Insurance, for instance, guarantees part of the “debt”
owed by commercial banks to their
depositors. Other programs guarantee
the debts of individuals (for example, the
Federal Housing Administration’s home
loan guarantees) or of corporations (the
guarantees offered to airlines in the wake
of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, for instance). All such programs
comprise the “financial safety net.”
The problem with government guar-
antees of private debts is that they affect
people’s willingness to take risky actions
or make risky investments. Consider a
business loan. The lender accepts the
risk that the borrower’s business project
will not generate a return sufficient to
repay the loan. Given the exposure to
this risk, the lender typically has an
incentive to pay attention to the borrower’s use of funds.
The interest rate and other terms of the loan will then
depend on the lender’s assessment of the risks to be taken
by the borrower. When repayment of a loan is guaranteed
by a third party, however, the inclination of the lender to
scrutinize the borrower’s actions and to assess the project’s
risks may be reduced.
The pricing of government guarantees varies consider-
ably, but in many cases these prices do not fully reflect risks
taken by borrowers. In such cases, a government guarantee
amounts to a subsidy for the borrower. Because they are pro-
tected from default, investors are willing to lend funds to
guaranteed borrowers at lower interest rates than they would
otherwise require. In short, the financial safety net distorts
financial markets by directing funding away from unprotected
sectors and toward those with guarantees. In addition, safety
net protection tends to encourage borrower risk-taking.
While the magnitude of the distortions created by the
safety net is hard to determine, the safety net itself is quite
large. My colleague John Walter and I have counted up the
debts and other private liabilities that have explicit federal
guarantees and found that over 16 percent of all private lia-
bilities in the U.S. economy had such protection at the end
of 1999. Insured deposits in banks and other financial insti-
tutions account for a large part of this number, but the
explicit safety net also includes many other items, such as
guarantees for student and small business loans. Occasion-
ally, Congress also grants ad hoc guarantees, as in the bailout
of Chrysler in 1980, although no such special programs were
included in our estimate.
Perhaps even more worrisome than the explicit safety net
is the prospect that some private debt
might enjoy implicit protection. Many
financial market observers believe that
some market participants are so big or
so important that they would not be
allowed to fail. If investors believe that
a particular borrower would be bailed out
in a situation of financial distress, then
that borrower will be able to obtain
funding at terms similar to those avail-
able to explicitly guaranteed borrowers.
In recent years, such government-spon-
sored enterprises as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have been the subject of a
growing debate concerning the extent to
which they benefit from implicit safety
net protection.
While explicit guarantees often bring
with them regulatory oversight to control the risk-taking by
protected borrowers, such oversight is often much weaker
for implicitly guaranteed borrowers. In addition, implicit
guarantees, by their very nature, are not priced — increas-
ing the potential for market distortions. Through our
research, Walter and I estimate that implicit guarantees could
account for as much as another 10 percent of all private lia-
bilities. Taking the implicit and explicit safety nets together,
then, perhaps a quarter of all private debts are shielded by
the government from the risk of default. Asafety net of this
size suggests the potential for sizable distortions in private
financial arrangements and assessments of risk.
The financial safety net arrived at its current state in a
piecemeal fashion: individual guarantees have been extended
in response to the perceived needs of an individual sector or
class of borrowers. Maybe what is needed now is a compre-
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